We are a group of EU Law legal experts researching Brexit. Ask us Anything.

I’m an EU citizen living in the UK, so I’m personally devastated about the referendum result. Thank you so much for doing this AMA!

My question: I’ve heard from some people that it will be really hard for the UK to legally get away with taking away any rights of EU citizens who already live in the UK. From what I’ve heard, there may be a deadline and everyone who came before the deadline will keep the right to stay and work in the UK that they had before Brexit. Theresa May’s remarks on this obviously speak a different language.

What is your take on this, from a European law perspective? Can we be reasonably confident that EU citizens currently already in the UK will fully and indefinitely keep their right to live and work in the UK? Would the British government lose a case in Strasbourg?

The question of what the UK will legally be able to do is very much dependent on the outcome of the renegotiation, as residence rights of EU citizens are determined by EU law, not UK law. Politically, it is in the interests of the UK and the other EU member states to reach an agreement on this swiftly due to the number of UK nationals in the EU and EU nationals in the UK. You might find it interesting to read this piece, which covers some of the legal issues in relation to the immigration position of EU citizens in the UK: http://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/let-them-stay-eu-nationals-uk-after-brexit#.V6Nr_ugrKUk The issues of the ECHR and the Strasbourg court is important. If the UK did seek to remove EU citizens with status to remain and work, particularly long term and permanent residents, it is very likely that this would be challenged under Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life). The outcome of this challenged would be decided according to whether Government’s decision is proportionate according to the facts of individual cases.

I greatly admired your video about the common market. It's one of the most intelligent contributions to the Brexit debate.

What is your view on how Theresa May may avoid the negative impact of Brexit?

Is there a political dynamic driven by economic requirements that may make Brexit impossible?

As a European, I prefer the UK to Brexit rather than stay in as a half-member, which isn't satisfactory to either side.

Thanks. Though these are pretty complex questions! Lots of people are working very hard to try to move the situation forward - but there are no easy answers, and there is a lot of uncertainty, before we can even begin to answer them with any degree of clarity.

What we do know is that Brexit will have certain negative impacts - indeed, it is already having certain negative impacts. They can't be avoided entirely.

What would the effects be on competition law?

UK competition law is one of the areas of law and policy that is, in fact, least likely to be affected by Brexit. There are several legal and political reasons for this.

However, the key reason is that UK competition law is already very closely integrated with EU competition law: the basic frameworks are the same.

The decision about which framework (i.e. UK or EU) is principally determined by the domestic (UK) or cross-border (EU) effects of the alleged anti-competitive conduct. Anti-competitive conduct that has a "cross-border" effect (e.g. it affects more than just the UK market / consumers) is presently addressed using EU law (including by the UK courts / authorities as agents of the EU institutions).

How such cross-border situations will be addressed post-Brexit will need to be negotiated as part of the UK/EU exit arrangements.

Can you explain or anticipate what might happen for British and Irish passports holders? I am a French passport holder and I have worked all my life in England, would I still be entitled to my pension? Would I have to apply for a visa, I do not want a British passport? What will happen to my children who have dual nationality and could also potentially have an Irish passport as their Dad is from Northern Ireland? To widen my question, what do you think will happen to all mixed nationalities families? Will status have to be negotiated unilaterally with each country and the U.K? Should a new political party arise from this Brexit vote? Thank you for all your previous videos which were so interesting. Thank you for setting up this question session, much appreciated

French and Irish passport holders will remain EU citizens and entitled to all the rights attached to that. If your children have dual nationality, British and French or British and Irish, they will have the best of both worlds: full access to the British system as British citizens and the benefits of EU citizenship as French or Irish citizens. For you, the exact arrangements are not yet clear and will ultimately depend on the exit negotiations. Looking at the rules for mixed-nationality families in the UK from outside the EU might offer some indication on the requirements that may be put in place for mixed UK/EU families after Brexit. To sponsor a spousal visa for a non-EU national, the British spouse must earn above a certain threshold (http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/reports/minimum-income-requirement-family) and the international spouse must prove a certain proficiency in the English language. However, given the increased pressure on the UK immigration system, it is likely that these rules might change. The pension is governed by highly complex social security legislation, and how that will apply will also depend on the outcome of the exit negotiations, so it is impossible to provide an answer at this point.

We're David Cameron's reforms meaningful?

Many legal experts believe that the February 2016 deal contained two particularly important changes:

1) a new set of principles to govern the relationship between the single market (which includes the UK) and the single currency (which does not include the UK).

2) a new power (the so-called "red card") for national parliaments to vote together so as to veto draft EU legislative proposals.

There were other interesting provisions , e.g. the UK's "opt out" from "ever closer union"; and the restrictions on equal treatment rights for migrant EU workers. But the two reforms mentioned above are generally seen as the most important and valuable. Though obviously - they are gone now!

If Scotland was to be independent is there anyway to stay in the EU? Could they also stay in the EEA and go straight into the Euro without adopting a new currency?

Legally speaking, the stronger view is that Scotland would need to apply to join the European Union should it vote to be an independent state. The procedure for joining the EU is outlined in the EU Treaties in Art 49 TEU.

The same is true should an independent Scotland wish to join the EEA - as an alternative to EU membership. Scotland would need to apply to become an EEA state in accordance with the terms of the EEA Agreement.

There's a lot of political and academic discussion about whether, in the process of becoming an independent state, Scotland could avoid the requirement to apply to join the EU as a new member state. For instance, some people have argued that Scotland could 'retain' the UK's membership post-Brexit. However, such views are high contestable.

As things stand, the Scottish Government's strongest hand will be in influencing the terms of the UK Government's negotiation position as a constituent part of the UK. Its influence is likely to be significant.

A practical question: what will be cut-off date for residency in the UK (EU nationals) and UK citizens in the EU (specifically France)? Is it the date of the referendum, the date when Art. 50 is triggered, or any (which) date after? This will affect all those who have been less then 5 years in the respective country, anyone who can prove residency for more than 5 years can currently apply for citizenship.

The important thing to be clear on for now is that the residence rights of EU citizens living in the UK, and of UK nationals living in other EU Member States is currently unchanged.

However, we still do not know what the rights of entry and residence will be once the UK has withdrawn, nor the date for the application of new rules, despite media speculation that the cut off date will be 23rd June. As this blog from The UK in a Changing Europe notes, a cut off date of 23rd June, given its retro-activity, would be very difficult to administer and so might be unlikely, but that is speculation at this stage: http://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/let-them-stay-eu-nationals-uk-after-brexit#.V6NjlbgrLIU

Whilst we can only speculate, it is in the interest of both the UK and the other Member States to agree on security of residence for citizens already resident on their territories, bearing in mind the numbers of UK nationals living in other Member States and the number of EU citizens living in the UK. More information is available on the same blogpost.

Rules on entry and residence will also depend on what agreement is reached between the UK and the rest of the EU about their future relationship. For instance, if the UK maintains access to the single market through an EEA agreement, it is likely that free movement of labour will continue (which is not certain). This will mean that the entry and residence rights of workers and their families will be very similar to those currently available. Residence rights might also be extended to other actors, such as students, since secondary legislation on these issues also apply to countries like Norway. On the other hand, if the relationship between the UK and the EU is different, and does not include free movement of labour, then entry and residence rules might well be different and are harder to predict.

Give it to me on the rocks. Is Brexit a big deal? Will it have long term consequences for me, my children and my way of living in Scandinavia? I have never been fond of the EU and would like to see my own country make the same decision once we learn what implications Brexit has caused in the long run.

Whether you support exit from the EU or favour staying in, there is no question that exiting the European Union is legally complex.

1) In areas where the EU has competence, EU law has becoming embedded in key areas of law and policy at the domestic level, from trade rules to workers rights to the environment to research and development and social cohesion. The UK will now have to look very carefully at how it will manage these areas and how law and funding of EU origin will operate afterwards. Given the amount of legislation, this will probably entail the delegation of a lot of decision-making to the executive, to the detriment of the involvement of the democratically elected parliament.

2) A new trade agreement will have to be negotiated, which it is anticipated will take far longer than the two year 'divorce' from the EU under Article 50 TEU. Moreover, this will require the UK to make decisions on free movement of labour (and negotiate this with the EU and its Member States), and therefore the question of free movement of people. Access to the single market is likely to conflict with the arguments made by some people about free movement of people.

3) Relatedly, the UK and the EU will have to agree on the entry and residence rights of Union citizens living in the UK and of UK nationals living in other Member States, regardless of what is decided on free movement of labour.

If other countries choose to go the same way as the UK, clearly the UK will have set some sort of precedent in terms of exit, but that doesn't mean that another Member State will take the same path, given that they will have their own views, and have to conduct their own negotiations on the same issues, such as the ongoing application of EU law, access to the single market, and residence and equal treatment rights, amongst many others. Nevertheless, should your own Member State follow suit, given what is outlined above, the consequences would be far-reaching.

What do you think of the other countries that are (or maybe) holding their own referendums (Italy, France, Hungary,etc.) & do you think they will succeed? Why or why not?

There have been concerns from some in Greece that it may actually be kicked out? Do you think that there is a chance of that? https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/23/these-countries-could-be-next-if-britain-leaves-the-e-u/

If other countries want to hold a referendum on their own EU membership, that of course is entirely their own prerogative. Though they should certainly learn important lessons from the UK experience, not least about the readiness of anti-EU campaigners to exploit the public's generally limited understanding of how the EU actually works, by peddling serious misconceptions and outright dishonesty so as to win votes; as well as the limited competence of pro-EU campaigners to respond effectively to such tactics. If it happened here in the UK, it can happen elsewhere too.

As for Greece: there is simply no legal / constitutional mechanism by which an existing Member State can be expelled from the EU against its will.

What are the options by which Article 50 can be triggered by the government?

Will the government be able to invoke Article 50 without requiring a parliamentary vote, or will it be able invoke Article 50 while relying on another legal justification/mechanism, such as the royal prerogative?

If there is no requirement for a Parliamentary vote, is/are the other option(s) for invoking Article 50 open to a legal challenge and what are your thoughts about the likelihood of such challenges succeeding?

(I understand a number of challenges as to the government's competence to invoke Article 50 are either underway or in contemplation).

Thank you for organising this Q&A and your succinct, clear and highly informative videos!

There is a debate amongst academics as to how Article 50 is to be triggered.

Some argue that national parliamentary ratification is necessary, while others see it as a matter that can be dealt with by the government alone.

For the view of some members of the University of Liverpool. See the following.

Mike Gordon is sceptical over the need for parliamentary ratification, as explained in this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IkmX9vv9zQk

In his view, an early general election would be more appropriate, in order to give the legitimacy to the government to carry out negotiations to leave the Union: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/06/mike-gordon-brexit-the-constitutional-necessity-of-an-early-general-election/

For a differing view, see that of Adam Tucker: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/29/adam-tucker-triggering-brexit-a-decision-for-the-government-but-under-parliamentary-scrutiny/

There are currently two legal challenges underway which are looking to ensure that Parliament has the right to approve any triggering of Article 50. One is from a private source, a law firm likely backed by big business who are pro-remain. Another is being crowd-funded. We will know more about this in October when the Court hears the legal challenge: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36834743

Until then, it will be a matter upon which reasonable people can disagree. Thanks.

Would it be fair to say that unless the UK embraces the Norwegian trade agreement, that any bespoke non standard agreement between the UK and EU will also take considerable time to negotiate and will in turn prolong any trade agreement process with any other country ?

That's a fairly safe assumption.

Any bespoke deal would likely take a considerable (!) number of years to agree. For reference: the EU/Canada CETA agreement (which is very limited in scope compared with EU membership status) took 7 years to negotiate - and it's still not in force!

Bespoke agreements, such as the EU/Canada deal, will also require ratification by the national parliaments of the remaining 27 member states, with the potential to delay implementation further.

By contrast, the process of joining an existing agreement (such as the EEA) would be much simpler for the UK. The UK can apply to join the EEA under the terms of the existing EEA Agreement as a member of the European Free Trade Area (it's already a member of EFTA along with all other EU member states).

what will the legal status of existing CJEU rulings and interpretations be within UK law once the UK has left the EU? This is especially relevant in the case that UK law is now reliant on a CJEU interpretation.

Secondly, what is the relationship between the CJEU and the EFTA Court in terms of legal bindingness? Does the CJEU bind the EFTA Court but not vice-versa (as I would expect)?

It will be for the UK - in particular, for Parliament - to decide the legal status (if any) of existing or indeed future CJEU rulings within the domestic legal system, after the UK's withdrawal from the EU.

The CJEU and the EFTA Court are entirely separate institutions. In respect of CJEU caselaw at the time of the EEA agreement (1992), the EFTA Court is explicitly obliged to adopt the same interpretation for corresponding provisions in the EEA. In respect of CJEU caselaw subsequent to the EEA agreement, the EFTA Court is in principle obliged to give due regard to the relevant EU caselaw but in practice the EFTA Court has decided it must again adopt the same interpretation as the CJEU. So for most purposes, relevant rulings of the CJEU also extend into the legal interpretation of the EEA by the EFTA Court.

What do you think are the actual chances that Article 50 will be triggered? Would you care to hazard a % guess?

The Prime Minister has indicated that she firmly intends to notify the UK's intention to withdraw from the EU, even if we don't yet know the precise timescale within which she intends to do so.

Obviously, there are various factors that could interpupt that plan, e.g. The legal challenges which claim Parliament must legislate for or at least consent to any such government notification, e.g. If a domestic crisis prompts a general election before the process of notification has been initiated.

So no one can reliably predict the chances of the UK making a valid Article 50 TEU notification - though most informed commentators believe it to be a very high probability.

What impact will withdrawal from the EU have on human rights protection in the UK?

Withdrawal of the EU will not affect the UK’s membership of the European Convention of Human Rights, which is convention agreed under a different international organisation, the Council of Europe. As a result, the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 will still apply, and it will still be possible to take the UK to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The EU does have its own Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter, this only applies to the EU institutions, or to the Member States when they are acting in the scope of Union law. This might be when they are implementing a Union regulation or when domestic law and policy impacts on, for example, the free movement of goods, workers, services, or capital.

What are the implications of Brexit on the Common Travel Area which depend on both countries being synchronised in many policy areas?

The CTA pre-dates the EU by quite some time, there having been some sort of immigration arrangement between the UK and Ireland since southern Ireland broke away from the UK. Furthermore, its continuation is an important aspect of maintaining stability in Northern Ireland given the views of many that there ought to be uninhibited travel between the North and the South. Its rationale is, therefore, external to the EU and it's arguably extremely important that the UK's exit from the EU does not threaten this arrangement (even if its functioning has been hanging on by a thread in recent years, particularly in relation to air travel). As to the compatibility with EU law of Ireland (as a continuing Member State) participating in an agreement with the UK (as a non-Member State), this blog post is very useful, but essentially doesn't envisage any significant issues: https://www.freemovement.org.uk/brexit-briefing-impact-on-common-travel-area-and-the-irish/

I've read that transitional legal arrangements are not unknown and that many have succeeded (India and many other former colonies) - how is the UK breaking away from the EU different to this? Many Thanks

Transitional arrangements are entirely normal when any legal system undergoes some form of change. Such change might be minor, but require significant transitional provisions. Or the change might be major, but only require minor transitional adjustments. Everything depends on the context.

So: one would naturally expect that, when a Member State leaves the EU, it will need a range of transitional arrangements - both internally, to protect its own legal system from adverse consequences; and externally, when it comes to smooth international relations.

But just to note: the UK is not a colony of the EU and its withdrawal from the EU is not comparable to processes of national independence of the sort experienced by many countries in the post-war period.

Do you think it's a good idea for the EU to make an example of the UK in order to discourage other would be exiters?
How could this look and what would be the long term effects for the UK?
What will happen to all those half finished EU development projects that are happening in places which voted so resoundingly to leave?
Thanks for doing this

International negotiations on important and complex issues are rarely determined by a single driver - like "being punitive" or "being conciliatory". We can expect the negotiations to involve a whole series of trade offs and compromises across a whole range of issues. However, it would be entirely rational for the EU to take the view that the UK cannot have a "better deal" overall, as a non-Member State than we currently enjoy as a full Member State.

My brother has just been admitted to University on a 4 year long course. His course involves going to France with ERASMUS in his third year. Will he, and people like him, be able to participate in that scheme?

As with so many Brexit Qs the answer here is: we don't know and we will have to wait and see (sorry!). In response to a written question by Labour MP Diana Johnson, David Davis, the Brexit Minister, refused to guarantee the future of Erasmus (you may find this Huffington Post article useful: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/uk-students-may-be-excluded-from-erasmus-scheme_uk_579b18abe4b0f42daa4a0334). Arguably - politically speaking - he had no option but to do this. It would be very arrogant of the UK to assume it can continue to participate in a scheme, such as Erasmus, which operates under the auspices of the EU, given the result of the referendum. What is perhaps missing from Davis's statement, however, is a positive commitment towards negotiating a role for the UK in Erasmus following the UK's exit from the EU. (Note, however, that the Russell Group (a group of leading UK universities) was somewhat more emphatic in its commitment to European integration post-Brexit: http://russellgroup.ac.uk/news/eu-referendum-statement/). So we can't say with any certainty that the Erasmus scheme will continue, but there is some more positive news. As the Huffington Post piece above shows, it seems that there is a commitment to continue Erasmus placements in the short term, so we can be reasonably optimistic that anyone starting a course now with an Erasmus year will be able to participate in the scheme. Furthermore, your brother can take heart from the fact that Erasmus is not an EU Member State only scheme - indeed, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Lichtenstein and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia all currently participate (see further here: https://www.erasmusplus.org.uk/participating-countries). Whilst there is every likelihood that the rest of the EU won't be particularly generous towards the UK in negotiating post-Brexit deals, there are reasons to be quite optimistic when it comes to Erasmus - the UK (along with Ireland) is the primary destination for Erasmus students who want to be educated in English. If the UK were to be forced out of Erasmus, this would (presumably) mean students from other countries would no longer be able to study in the UK under the scheme, it operating on the basis of reciprocity. So, the future participation of UK students in Erasmus may well be saved because of the country's attraction as a destination for students from abroad. In other words, would Erasmus be as a successful a scheme without the UK as a participant? Arguably not - when the dust settles, the rest of the EU may well take the view that it needs the UK to continue to participate in Erasmus.
Hope that helps and that your brother is able to go on his Erasmus year! (There are five of us here answering your questions, three of us did Erasmus years and have nothing but good things to say about our experiences - we truly hope there is a way of ensuring this remains an option for UK students well into the future).

I've been told that the EU president recently signed a deal with Canada that was very similar to TTIP without passing it through the EU parliament. Please could you clarify if this is the case, and if so, why TTIP had to go to the EU Parliament but CETA(?) didn't?

The agreement you're referring to is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). It's an international trade agreement concluded between the EU (under the powers given to it by the 28 Member States in the EU Treaties) and Canada. Its purpose is to eliminate a broad range of trade barriers across a number of economic sectors. It was concluded in 2014. You can find out more info here: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/

To clarify: the European Parliament needs to approve the agreement before it enters into effect. Without that approval, the agreement can't enter into force.

In addition to that, the CETA agreement also requires the approval of the Council of the European Union (composed of national government ministers) and the national parliaments of the 28 EU member states. This approval process has not yet been completed.

For info: it's true that the CETA agreement may be applied provisionally with the approval of the Council of the European Union and the consent of European Parliament - a lesser test. However, this doesn't get around the approval requirements in the previous paragraph.

So, to sum up, it's not possible for the CETA agreement to apply - provisionally or permanently - without the European Parliament's direct involvement. Ultimately, it has a veto. As do the 28 national parliaments.

Hope that helps!

For info, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) you mention is comparable to Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement in terms of objectives and scope. However, at present, it is still under negotiation between the EU institutions (on behalf of the Member States) and the United States government.

If the British political establishment were to decide (for example because of catastrophic economic downturn) that they do not want to follow through with Brexit, what would be the most probable and politically and constitutionally sound way to do it? Another referendum? Parliament saying it does not recognise the vote? Never invoking article 50?

Also what opinion does current Constitutional law theory have on referendums (or referenda?) in general? Should there be a qualified majority? Should it be forbidden that one country (England) can simply gloss over the will of the other (Scotland)? Should referendums/referenda be in any way limited?

If such scholarly opinion does exist, were any legal experts consulted during the preparation of the vote and if yes, was any of their advice implemented?

Thank you in advance for any answers.

It seems perfectly possible that the political establishment could reverse the referendum decision. In the UK, parliament is sovereign, and any referendum can only be advisory. I think it would be constitutionally difficult for Parliament to simply ignore the referendum result. One possibility, suggested by labour leadership candidate Owen Smith, is for a 2nd referendum on the terms of our deal to leave. This would offer the UK public the option as to whether they still wanted to leave. However, this may be politically dangerous as it would still essentially mean ignoring the first referendum result.

As for the constitutional theory on your referendum. One of your best points of contact is Stephen Tierney. He has written extensively about the Brexit Referendum, and the Scotland Independence referendum.

https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/25/stephen-tierney-was-the-brexit-referendum-democratic/ Thanks

I had plans to do a masters in European law, either at KCL or abroad (most likely in the Netherlands). Is there any point now? And will I have to pay non-EU student fees if I wanted to study in Holland?

As a group of EU law academics, we think doing a masters in European law is something everybody should consider! :-) On a more serious note, there is without doubt enormous value in UK nationals continuing to study EU law (and we're not just saying this to keep ourselves in a job!). Any sort of exit from the EU, will inevitably result in decades of complex legal negotiations. This won't just last for the two year period envisaged by Article 50 - the process of disentangling the UK's legal system from the influence of EU law is a phenomenally complex one. For any lawyer seeking to practise in the UK for the foreseeable future a high level of knowledge of EU law is, therefore, an excellent selling point in the employment market. Furthermore, most people seem to be in favour of the UK participating in the single market in some way or other post-Brexit, so there is certainly a bright future for any expert on EU trade law. The issue of student fees is a trickier one - as, like with so many answers to questions around Brexit, we won't know until further details of the legal arrangement the UK reaches with the rest of Europe is clearer. At the moment, EU citizens (that is nationals of EU Member States) are entitled to pay student fees on the same basis as nationals of the host state in which they are studying - so, under current arrangements, you would pay the same as a Dutch national (considerably less than UK tuition fees, for example). However, if EU law ceases to apply to the UK, the Dutch authorities would be under no obligation to continue to offer this favourable status to UK nationals. It is worth remembering, however, that the UK is still a member of the EU - and will likely remain so for at least a few more years (if we assume that when Art 50 is triggered the two year period that is envisaged is used in full) - so, if you are considering a Masters in Holland it might be worth doing so before the UK leaves the EU and you lose your rights as a EU citizen student.

In what areas can we expect to see a pooling of sovereignty in post brexit EU and can we expect to see countries take back sovereignty in some areas?

Also how much of an impact do you predict the next french elections to have on the future of the union?

After the UK leaves the EU, the 27 remaining Member States can decide for themselves whether they want to pursue further cooperation requiring Treaty change and, if so, in which fields. Conversely, they can decide to lessen their degree of cooperation in certain areas.

However, all Treaty changes require the unanimous agreement of the Member States and - in the vast majority of situations - that also means domestic ratification (by their national parliament and / or a national referendum, depending on their own constitutional requirements).

One should note that the UK's withdrawal will make this process easier than would have been the case if we were to remain a Member State: the European Union Act 2011 requires the UK to hold a national referendum in order to approve any future EU treaty reform (and many other types of decision as well) which might entail an expansion of EU competence. Many people felt that that had effectively "killed off" the chances of future EU treaty reform - so the UK's departure, and the elimination of the EUA 2011 from the equation, could make future EU reform easier to implement.

Hi - thanks for doing this, I really enjoyed your lecture in the run up to the referendum. I'm only sorry that it didn't persuade more people! I have a question about jurisdiction and the Brussels Regulation, which might not be what you had in mind for this discussion! Anyway, what do you think will happen to the ECJ's Owusu v Jackson decision - i.e. that English domiciled corporates shall be sued in England rather than the place where, for example, the tort took place (in that case Jamaica)? This is an important issue for business and human rights litigation and I'm interested to hear your views. I understand that some countries like Switzerland and Iceland have followed Owusu v Jackson. But might the UK revert to common law forum non conveniens?

Unfortunately, this is yet another Q to which the answer is... we will have to wait and see what the outcome of the negotiations between the EU and the UK are before we can say too much on any more technical legal questions (sorry!). At a very basic level, however, EU Regulations are directly applicable in the UK legal system by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 and Art 288 TFEU - when the Treaties cease to apply in the UK (which they would following Brexit) we might assume that Regulations would no longer have effect. However, the idea that overnight all EU law would cease to apply is perhaps a little unrealistic... In relation to the particular issue of the Brussels Regulation, it is worth remembering that this instrument has its origins in international law and covers issues that have never been seen solely as ones for the EU - building upon the Hague Convention and ensuring the protection of arrangements under EU law provides a better mechanism for enforcing what was already going on under international law. In this sense, arguably the arrangements under the Brussels Regulation have a better chance of surviving post-Brexit than other areas of EU law. That said, there are important differences between the Hague Convention and the current Brussels Regulation that the UK may decide it doesn't want to be bound by post-Brexit. I'm afraid none of us have any great expertise on the Brussels Regulation (beyond the general constitutional question of the application of EU law post-Brexit), however the post below, written before the vote to leave, but speculating on the post-Brexit status of the Brussels Regulation, is very informative: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e7f973d8-44bf-408f-ba07-76a430e9e8a5

Hello, I am French, living in France with my British partner and our kids (I have lived, studied and worked in the UK for 16 years). My questions are: How can the law ensure that EU leaders take into account the danger that Brexit could bring to the EU structure and the international economy? How can the law force EU leaders to decide to reform the EU and ensure that Britain can stay under new terms? Also, could the current legal battles (against Farage/Johnson and the ones pushing for the parliament to decide on Brexit, and not the current government) have a real affect on the referendum result and make it void? Last one: how can the law ensure that British people working in Europe can preserve their EU rights and the same for EU citizens living in Britain? Thank you for doing this. I have watched and shared your videos before and after Brexit. Thank you.

Hello. Thank you for your interest. The mechanisms for ensuring that EU leaders take into account any negative repercussions of Brexit are largely political in nature, as the only legal mechanism for exit is Article 50 TEU, which is not very detailed in nature. Nevertheless, there are various accountability mechanisms written into that provision. For instance, under Article 50(2) TEU, the European Council, which comprises the Heads of State and Government, provides guidelines that the Union must follow when negotiating and concluding an agreement with the UK. It is therefore possible for political pressure to be placed on domestic Heads of State to ensure that key issues are included. Article 50(2) also requires that the withdrawal agreement takes into account the future relationship between the UK and the EU. In terms of how the final agreement is concluded, it must be voted on by the Council of Ministers, which comprises democratically elected government ministers and which is required to debate publicly under Article 16(8) TEU. They will vote by qualified majority. The agreement also requires the consent of the European Parliament. Therefore, there are opportunities for political pressure to be placed on various actors. Political pressure can also be placed on UK politicians, who will be negotiating as third country representatives for these purposes. Article 20(d) TFEU also gives Union citizens the right to address the Union institutions and petition the European Parliament.
Similarly, any pressure to reform the EU will largely be political in nature. The nature and ambit of EU activity is framed by the Union treaties, signed by the Member States, and the EU institutions must act within these. There must therefore be the political will for reform, though the use of legal mechanisms such as Article 50 TEU have clearly triggered such political debates. Given the diverse reasons people voted to leave the EU, and the interests of the other EU Member States, it seems unlikely that EU reform could be reached before UK exit, even though Article 50 TEU is not yet triggered. David Cameron’s ‘Remain’ argument was based on a reformed EU on the basis of his renegotiation but this did not convince those who voted to leave. The UK is a member of the EU as a sovereign nation and by virtue of its own Act of Parliament, the European Communities Act 1972. As a result, even before Article 50 TEU, there are no legal rules that force the UK to remain in the EU. Although there have been some arguments made for invalidating the referendum through the courts (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/30/politics-brexit-unlawful-eu-uk), it is very unlikely, for constitutional reasons, that the judicial branch would overturn such a politically-rooted decision. There is a legal challenge underway currently, which is looking to guarantee that Parliament has to play a role in triggering Article 50 and beginning our negotiations to leave the European Union.( http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36834743).

There were lots of examples shown in the Scottish referendum that it would be difficult to remove people's EU citizenship, that it would be arbitrary to remove it from people that don't want to lose it, I wondered if you could comment on this, and if there could be a case to be heard?

Under Article 20 TFEU, Union citizenship is additional too, and does not replace national citizenship. In short, while the removal of Union citizenship from UK nationals, including those who want to maintain it, seems arbitrary, it is the result of the fact that EU citizens only legally enjoy Union citizenship because they have national citizenship of a Member State of the Union. While the Court of Justice did state, in the Rottmann case (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62008CJ0135), that Member States are required to take into account the consequent loss of Union citizenship that arises when they revoke someone's national citizenship, this was not a strict rule that Union citizenship cannot be lost and, in any case, operated in a very different factual context. Moreover, the UK courts have been very critical of the Rottmann case and have consistently maintained that it is for the UK to determine questions of citizenship, regardless of the impact on Union citizenship. See cases such as G1 v Secretary of State for the Home Dept and also Pham (https://www.supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2013_0150_Judgment.pdf). Ultimately, the courts are likely to view the issue as a political decision to leave the Union, regardless of the consequent impact on Union citizenship.

What does Article 50 state? Any interesting things that might surprise us?

Article 50

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.

There are more answers on this page discussing Article 50 in greater detail.

Article 50 TEU is a provision in the Treaty on the European Union that explicitly states that an EU Member State can leave the Union. It also sets the broad legal framework, at EU level, for exit from both domestic and Union perspectives. However, it is not a detailed provision, leading to debate over how it operates in practice. Article 50(1) TEU states that a Member State can decide to withdraw from the EU based on its own constitutional requirements. Article 50(2) TEU requires a Member State to notify the European Council – the political institution comprising the Heads of Government of the Member States – of its intention to leave. The Union will then negotiate a withdrawal agreement with the departing Member State. Therefore, EU Treaties would cease to apply to the UK upon the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or two years after the UK has triggered Article 50. This two years can be extended but only with the unanimous agreement of the Member States.

One of the issues that has arisen in relation to Article 50 has been when Article 50 TEU will/should be triggered. While the European Parliament has adopted a resolution (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160628IPR34006/MEPs-call-for-swift-Brexit-to-end-uncertainty-and-for-deep-EU-reform) stating that the UK should seek to implement the outcome of the referendum as soon as possible, it is still unclear, from the UK side when it will be triggered.

The second issue is who can trigger Article 50 TEU and under what legal mechanism. All the provision states is that the UK does this under ‘its own constitutional requirements’, though from an EU perspective, it will be the Prime Minister who formally triggers Article 50 TEU at the European Council. There is academic debate as to how this can be done, ranging from the royal prerogative to parliamentary repeal of the European Communities Act 1972. Check out Adam Tucker’s blog post, which offers an overview of some of the arguments and then presents his own take. https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/29/adam-tucker-triggering-brexit-a-decision-for-the-government-but-under-parliamentary-scrutiny/

The third issue is what Article 50 TEU negotiations cover. Article 50 only requires the Union to ‘tale account future relations’ between the EU and the UK when negotiating a withdrawal agreement, with no requirement that this cover, for instance, formal trade agreements. It is generally accepted that withdrawal negotiations will focus on specific issues such as the budgetary implications of Brexit, and the residence status of UK nationals living in other Member States and of non-national Union citizens in the UK. It is likely that other negotiations will be needed in relation to future trade.

What requirements will need to be met or agreed before the UK can join the WTO, post Brexit?

The UK is already a member of the WTO.

Do you think that the new deal will go to second referendum?

Legally, there is no obstacle to the UK holding a second referendum on EU membership. The result of the June 23rd referendum is non-binding: the default position under UK constitutional law.

The decision whether or not to hold a second referendum is a political one. The Prime Minister has recently indicated a commitment to honour the result of the June referendum: in her words, "Brexit means Brexit," so a second referendum is presently unlikely.

A lot of people are assuming the UK is allowed to negotiate an EU trade agreement in parallel to exit talks and ideally conclude both simultaneously. Are there any legal obstacles that might prevent this?

We think it’s very difficult to see how both could be concluded simultaneously. Member States of the EU must conclude trade deals as a whole, so while the UK remains a member of the EU (which it will until after the negotiations have been concluded), it cannot conclude trade deals unilaterally (Article 218 TFEU).

What's your feeling on how your department or University might have to deal with funding for the future in a post exit Britain? Do you see it as a given you'll receive less from Westminster?

On the flip side do you feel there's any positive in that it might allow the public to put more scrutiny on how public money is spent?

These aren't legal questions. Moreover, they involve complete imponderables that no-one is capable of answering.

It is worth recalling that a very substantial majority of any university's income derives from tuition fees - but it is often the remaining income, especially from UK and EU research funding, that provides the springboard for world class projects and partnerships.

So it is unsurprising that many universities are deeply worried about the potential impact of UK withdrawal not only upon their future funding but more importantly upon the quality of scientific work and collaboration which has been so important to our economic and social development.

We are unsure how the withdrawal of EU research funding from UK universities could in itself "allow the public to put more scrutiny on how public money is spent". The allocation of EU research funding is subject to the same - if not, even more - rigorous peer review processes as national research funding.

Can you explain or anticipate what might happen for British and Irish passports holders? I am a French passport holder and I have worked all my life in England, would I still be entitled to my pension? Would I have to apply for a visa, I do not want a British passport? What will happen to my children who have dual nationality and could also potentially have an Irish passport as their Dad is from Northern Ireland? To widen my question, what do you think will happen to all mixed nationalities families? Will status have to be negotiated unilaterally with each country and the U.K? Should a new political party arise from this Brexit vote? Thank you for setting up this question session, much appreciated

This is a duplicate. See the other post for our response. Thanks.

What do you think the best option for the UK is right now i.e. I've heard a lot about the Norway option and the Swiss option?

Plus, I was hoping to exercise my free movement rights to move abroad to work when I finish my studies. That will be in 2 years or less, would that be more difficult for me now to say move to the Netherlands?

The UK Government has committed itself to embark on the process of exiting the European Union. It is not yet clear what the UK Government's negotiating aims and objectives are. We can expect these to firm up in the coming months.

Norway and Switzerland both have different relationships with the EU as non-Member States. Norway is most closely integrated with the EU (e.g. it's in the single market) as a member of the EEA (European Economic Area). Switzerland's position is more complex and based on a series of bi-lateral treaties concluded with the EU.

The mood music so far indicates that the UK Government is keen to secure its own "special deal" with the EU - i.e. one not based directly on existing models such as the EEA. Whether this will be possible remains to be seen. The UK will no get what it wants without the full agreement of the remaining 27 EU Member States, all of whom have their own individual and collective interests to protect in the Brexit process.

Your future rights of movement within the EU as a UK citizen will depend on the outcome of the exit negotiations - when these begin formally. The UK is very keen to restrict the right of EU nationals to enter the UK. It's possible that, in response, EU member states may impose similar restrictions on UK nationals who wish to work and reside in the EU.

I heard from a Tory member that if Gove had won the leadership race, he would have delayed invoking article 50 until the summer next year when (apparently) changes to the Lisbon Treaty meant that the UK would have required the vote of all EU member states to leave. Is this the case?

We have no idea what this might be about - certainly, it bears no relationship to what EU law actually says or does!

As you may have gathered, a lot of people are saying a lot of things, but much of it is completely misleading if not altogether untrue. It sounds like this belongs in the same category...

Given that there were quite a lot of people who were misinformed about this particular political issue, should politics be a compulsory subject at school?

That is a debatable issue. Perhaps more at fault, in terms of misinformation, was the media in this campaign. We can expect the campaigns to exaggerate their sides of the story, but the media should have played a greater role in ensuring that basic facts could not be ignored.

Many thanks for your response. I have always been taught to question everything and not believe everything the media says or reports. However, not everyone thinks for themselves in this way because it is difficult to do that without some prior knowledge of the subject. Thus, not knowing enough about politics (because it isn't taught in schools) means that people will often happily believe any statements which align with their preconceptions. I'm not saying the media aren't to blame at all, but wouldn't this issue be helped by education?

This is obviously beyond our specific area of expertise, but it is an interesting point. I can understand your position. I imagine many leave school not being aware what the Parliament is, or how government operates. The most significant bar to teaching politics in school, is likely to be the political contestation over what the content of the course would be. But I agree that this shouldn’t necessarily bar it from the syllabus.

Do you think it will be possible or even likely for the UK to be able to negotiate an Trade Deal* with the EU which includes Passporting of Financial services? Whilst unprecedented, these are unprecedented times. Whether that's a *Free trade deal or otherwise - some sort of licensing.

Maintaining UK access to EU financial markets will likely be key to Brexit negotiations. As you say, the current regime is governed by the EU passporting scheme under which financial service providers lawfully registered in one EU member state can access financial services markets across the EU.

If the UK left the EU to join the EEA (European Economic Area), EU passporting rights could be maintained. However, the UK would lose influence over the future developments of the implementing regulations.

Beyond that option, the UK would have to renegotiate the retention of EU passport rights (or establish a new scheme) as part of a broader settlement with the remaining 27 EU Member States.

Is the Queen not entitled to give her direction when politics and economy are in turmoil, in a major crisis? In this context, she could be the saviour of this economic downfall and political farce, the protector of British, Europe and international economy. It seems strange that in a crisis she says nothing. Thank you for your support in this crisis.

The Queen’s role in political affairs is marginal. There is a convention, a common sense agreement amongst the political establishment, that the Queen will not exercise any genuine political power.

On the other hand, there are many who believe that Parliament should be able to play the “saviour” role that you are looking for. While it is not something agreed on by all, Parliament may be able to refuse to implement the results of the referendum if they believe it is in Britain’s best interests. There is a legal challenge underway currently, which is looking to guarantee that Parliament has to play a role in triggering Article 50 and beginning our negotiations to leave the European Union.( http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36834743). Thanks.

With the number of lies and falsehoods that have perpetrated the recent EU referendum. These actions have damaged the UK Parliament reputation around the globe, once a bastion for democracy, sadly this is no longer the case. More importantly, at this time, it has been unwilling to reprimand and punish those responsible. Therefore, these lies and falsehoods have been pointed erroneously at the EU and intentionally have damaged the EU reputation. Would it be appropriate for the EU to place sanctions on the UK to pay for damages caused?

There is no legal regime under which the EU has any competence to sue the UK for damages in this way. While the UK can be brought before the EU’s Court of Justice, the Union do not have competence over claims of defamation based on damage to reputation. The UK does have a duty to act in a cooperative manner with the Union, but it seems very unlikely it could be stretched to these circumstances.

Have you taken a look at Dr Richard North's 'Flexcit' plan, and if so, what are you opinions on it?

Also, given that you accused the leave campaign of "dishonesty on an industrial scale", I'd just like to put it out there that this phrase could be used to describe our entry into the EEC and the 1975 referendum, in which figures like Ted Heath knowingly mislead the public into joining a 'common market', when documents like FCO 30/1048 (North's analysis) and Lord Kilmuir's letter to Heath prove that they knew it was far more than just that. Yet Heath's white paper contained the words “There is no question of Britain losing essential…sovereignty.”, then he later said in 1973 "There are some in this country who fear that in going into Europe we shall in some way sacrifice independence and sovereignty. These fears, I need hardly say, are completely unjustified." and Wilson's pamphlet is misleading at best.

No, we're not aware of North's academic work on EU law: it does not appear to be published in the mainstream international peer reviewed journals for the field of European legal studies (though do feel free to point us in the right direction, if we have missed something out here). We tend to work with materials meeting the proper standards for academic research, which are internationally recognised for our discipline.

As for your reference to the referendum debate in the 1970s, we are not sure what point you are making here. E.g. Are you suggesting that, because you feel someone was dishonest 50 years ago, it can absolve others of responsibility for being dishonest now?

E.g. Are you suggesting that, because you feel someone was dishonest 50 years ago, it can absolve others of responsibility for being dishonest now?

No, both official campaigns produced misleading material (£350m, Turkey joining the EU, Osborne's treasury figures + punishment budget that would never have passed through the commons, the Calais border to name a few). I just find it a little hypocritical given that we were taken in on false pretences (and I must admit I'm surprised that the media hasn't made more of this issue) and in some cases, outright lies from people like Heath (which I believe the anti-markeeters did attempt to point out) that it is wrong for us to leave due to misleading information being provided by the official Leave campaign. Of course this doesn't absolve anyone from lying, I just think that it is wrong to act as if Vote Leave are the only group who have been dishonest. I believe Dr North has actually pointed this out to you.

I guess, that in a way, some would see this as correcting a historical mistake, as would Dr North. Now I am aware that you may not be on the best of terms, but as both Professor Dougan and Dr North have been advising Parliamentary committees, I would suggest taking a look at his exit plan, as it seems to me that there are not many individuals that have some idea of what this country's post-Brexit plan is going to be, or what potential negotiations will occur.

Feel free to disregard my suggestion though, after all I had no part in the creation of Flexcit, and am simply someone who has read through it.

The 1975 referendum had nothing to do with the 2016 one. It is irrelevant what Heath did or did not say; what matters is that this referendum was influenced by dishonesty on a massive scale.

You should also take a long hard look at North's background and ask yourself whether he can be trusted as an independent, impartial advisor. For example, it's interesting to observe that while Dougan is a professor of European law, North's doctorate is in food safety; he has no formal qualifications in the field.

The 1975 referendum had nothing to do with the 2016 one. It is irrelevant what Heath did or did not say;

what matters is that this referendum was influenced by dishonesty on a massive scale.

So you believe that dishonesty on a massive scale is only an issue in a referendum where we have voted to leave the EU, whereas dishonesty that persuaded many to vote to stay in is acceptable? As I stated, Vote Leave are not the only organisation guilty of dishonesty in this referendum, either. And whilst you may feel that the result should be overturned, do realise that it would result in even more distrust of politicians, and considering we had Mr Blair complaining about populism and wondering where it came from, some of them don't seem to realise why that is. After all, FCO 30/1048 did state that there would be a feeling of alienation from Brussels that should be overcome somehow. It also stated that "After entry, there would be a major responsibility on HMG and all political parties to not exacerbate public concern by attributing unpopular measures or unfavourable economic developments to the remote and unmanageable workings of the Community".

You should also take a long hard look at North's background and ask yourself whether he can be trusted as an independent, impartial advisor.

As far as I'm aware, Flexcit was not solely authored by North - it's not a one-man project and what in particular about his background worries you? The Bruges Group, for example, are a reputable think tank, as are the IEA. I would also hardly call Dougan impartial, given that he does not seem to properly address the arguments for leaving. For example, here it is stated that he "analyses the substance of each viewpoint and delivers an informed assessment of the UK's potential future position, both as a member of the EU and in the wake of a vote to leave" yet he would says of the legal review, "it will have to be done very, very quickly". Instead, he would have said that "some" (i.e himself and his supporters) thought it would have to be done quickly. Others suggest that it could be done at a more leisurely pace.

He also states that "Because it basically means that you have to do everything the EU says but you don’t have any influence over the formulation of the rules and you still have to pay a whopping membership fee for the privilege of belonging to the single market." This is simply not true at all - Norway refused to implement directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to offshore oil and gas legislation for example.

I also did not state that Dr North would be impartial - and given that we seem to be on a course to leave the EU, what problems would there be with his pro-Brexit leanings?

it's interesting to observe that while Dougan is a professor of European law

It's also interesting to observe that here, on that particular webpage is a disclaimer that states: "Professor Dougan is an employee of the University of Liverpool. He does not work for, undertake paid consultancy for, or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article/post." and then "However, for so long as I remain an employee of the University of Liverpool, I am entitled to continue referring to the 2006 award among my own professional distinctions."

He is the holder of a Jean Monnet chair, and that post is financed by the European Union. And whilst the money was not paid to Dougan directly, it was paid to the University, and they pay him.

The strange thing is, I didn't come here to debate Professor Dougan's credentials (which as I have said, are far better than mine - I am simply offering my opinion here) and his arguments in favour of remaining, but you seem to have forced my hand. All I wanted to know was if they had considered Flexcit as a potential plan (despite stating before the referendum that in regards to a post-brexit situation "I have to say that the main answer is no-one has a clue – nobody has a clue. And if anybody claims they have some detailed or precise understanding of anything that will happen post leaving the EU, then they're probably very seriously deluded". when there were those offering potential exit pathways) and if they were aware of "industrial dishonesty" in regards to the EU has come from more than just Vote Leave.

This post contains inaccurate and misleading claims that Prof Dougan's position or salary is funded by the EU and, more generally, seeks to call into question the integrity of academic work on the basis of entirely spurious arguments.

Please see the post above, in reply to "slyfox12".

We are happy to spend our time replying to bona fide questions from members of the public - but we do not intend to spend our time defending our colleagues and our profession against unjustified attacks.

A direct question for Michael Dougan on his follow up video on the EU ref.

In the video you state:

My entire salary is paid by the the University of Liverpool and The University of Liverpool does not receive a penny of external funding in order to pay that salary

I would like to clarify is this you stating that the University of Liverpool itself never receives funding of any kind from the EU? Or are you clarifying that the University of Liverpool does not receive any money to pay towards your salary?

As a secondary question I would like to put this line of question to bed as obviously it is quite insulting to be cast as simply as some kind of paid puppet for the EU for your professional work. In the original article posted online by the University of Liverpool around the talk given on Brexit could you or your department further explain what the award money the University received in 2006 was spent on especially in light of the following excerpt from the article.

In 2006, the University of Liverpool was awarded a Jean Monnet Chair – a form of EU grant – consisting of €36,000. Under the terms of the grant, part of the money was spent on a major academic conference, the outputs from which were published by the usual process of international peer review. The remaining funds were spent on general teaching costs.

I would mainly like to know what the remaining funds would have paid for in relation to the term teaching costs?

Prof Dougan may well add a few comments of his own on this particular issue. In the meantime, in response to your specific questions:

1) Of course the University of Liverpool - like virtually every university in the UK, as well as vast numbers of individuals, together with whole cities, regions and indeed countries - receives various forms of funding from the EU (just as they receive funding from other public and private sources). It is a frankly bizarre argument to suggest that, because universities receive some of their funding from the EU, academic work at those institutions has somehow been rendered biased. That would seek to discredit the work of our entire higher education sector - a preposterous argument. Though in fact, many academics see this sort of argument as just another part of the disturbing attack launched, particularly by leading Leave campaigners, on the basic values of scientific expertise and intellectual integrity that form the bedrock of a civilised society.

2) If we have understood your question correctly, you want to know, specifically, what c. £15,000 of EU income was spent on by the University of Liverpool, over 10 years ago? Well, given that we have an annual turnover approaching £400,000,000, we can guarantee it didn't pay for very much. But you can assume "teaching costs" will have covered things like paying for part-time staff to give additional tutorials which could not be covered by full time staff or for PhD students to give lectures as part of their professional training to join the academic profession.