EULawAtLiverpool

International negotiations on important and complex issues are rarely determined by a single driver - like "being punitive" or "being conciliatory". We can expect the negotiations to involve a whole series of trade offs and compromises across a whole range of issues. However, it would be entirely rational for the EU to take the view that the UK cannot have a "better deal" overall, as a non-Member State than we currently enjoy as a full Member State.

Many legal experts believe that the February 2016 deal contained two particularly important changes:

1) a new set of principles to govern the relationship between the single market (which includes the UK) and the single currency (which does not include the UK).

2) a new power (the so-called "red card") for national parliaments to vote together so as to veto draft EU legislative proposals.

There were other interesting provisions , e.g. the UK's "opt out" from "ever closer union"; and the restrictions on equal treatment rights for migrant EU workers. But the two reforms mentioned above are generally seen as the most important and valuable. Though obviously - they are gone now!

If other countries want to hold a referendum on their own EU membership, that of course is entirely their own prerogative. Though they should certainly learn important lessons from the UK experience, not least about the readiness of anti-EU campaigners to exploit the public's generally limited understanding of how the EU actually works, by peddling serious misconceptions and outright dishonesty so as to win votes; as well as the limited competence of pro-EU campaigners to respond effectively to such tactics. If it happened here in the UK, it can happen elsewhere too.

As for Greece: there is simply no legal / constitutional mechanism by which an existing Member State can be expelled from the EU against its will.

UK competition law is one of the areas of law and policy that is, in fact, least likely to be affected by Brexit. There are several legal and political reasons for this.

However, the key reason is that UK competition law is already very closely integrated with EU competition law: the basic frameworks are the same.

The decision about which framework (i.e. UK or EU) is principally determined by the domestic (UK) or cross-border (EU) effects of the alleged anti-competitive conduct. Anti-competitive conduct that has a "cross-border" effect (e.g. it affects more than just the UK market / consumers) is presently addressed using EU law (including by the UK courts / authorities as agents of the EU institutions).

How such cross-border situations will be addressed post-Brexit will need to be negotiated as part of the UK/EU exit arrangements.

Legally speaking, the stronger view is that Scotland would need to apply to join the European Union should it vote to be an independent state. The procedure for joining the EU is outlined in the EU Treaties in Art 49 TEU.

The same is true should an independent Scotland wish to join the EEA - as an alternative to EU membership. Scotland would need to apply to become an EEA state in accordance with the terms of the EEA Agreement.

There's a lot of political and academic discussion about whether, in the process of becoming an independent state, Scotland could avoid the requirement to apply to join the EU as a new member state. For instance, some people have argued that Scotland could 'retain' the UK's membership post-Brexit. However, such views are high contestable.

As things stand, the Scottish Government's strongest hand will be in influencing the terms of the UK Government's negotiation position as a constituent part of the UK. Its influence is likely to be significant.