have_a_word
Highest Rated Comments
have_a_word6 karma
Hi, Mr. Ferguson. I'm a huge fan, been waiting for this AMA since I joined Reddit. I'd definitely prefer a real conversation with you, but if I have to come up with some interview-style questions, here goes:
How did you tolerate having to make conversation with vapid celebrities for so long?
Which was more difficult, getting sober or becoming vegan?
have_a_word5 karma
Prof. Rinard:
I'm aware it's a minority view, but I tend see a large part of epistemology as (to put it crudely) normative philosophy of mind.
- Do you see epistemology as a normative endeavor (whether deriving from phil mind or not)?
- If so or if not, how would you accommodate a person who thinks something like Bayesian confirmation or computational models is too far removed from what it is trying to explain (i.e. how we think)?
- How is your work commensurate with what we know from cognitive science?
have_a_word-1 karma
I do phil language and phil mind, studied at Rutgers and UNC (BA and MA), and am now looking to enroll in a(nother) PhD program. I'll be teaching as an adjunct this fall at a community college far from my previous contacts. How would you suggest I remain abreast of the field and in contact with the big players in order to increase my chances of getting into a PhD program?
have_a_word8 karma
This is for Prof. Rayo. Thank you for your work with WiPhi. I'm friends with those guys, and I think they fill an important gap between laypeople and professional philosophers (as do you by getting on Reddit).
I read the abstract on your website of your and Elga's paper. You seem to espouse a functionalist way of specifying mental states, and one that serves primarily explanatory purposes. I'm sympathetic to this kind of view of the mind, but I've run into some problems. What do you do about the problem of misrepresentation? Specifically how can a creature be said to misrepresent its environment on a theory where mental states are provided as explanations for action? (I tend to think that misrepresentation is an epistemic issue, rather than one for phil of mind, and I know this is a minority view, so I'd like help being convinced of it.) Do you see the problem of misrepresentation as a normative issue; and, in turn, does a theory of mind need to accommodate it?
View HistoryShare Link