billy_teats

they can just buy the router and look at the manual. they can probably bypass the purchase and just download the manual.

the ISP with a backdoor on your router would NOT be able to see your computers HTTPS traffic to an external website, like gmail. The information is encrypted on your laptop/phone and decrypted at the website. The router can see where you're going, gmail.com, but it cannot view the payload (the contents of an email).

Unless the router pushes some config that uploads its certificate to your trusted certificate store. Then the router could issue itself a cert for gmail.com and your browser would essentially send an email to your router, which would view the email in plaintext, then send that on your behalf to gmail.com.

short answer no.

long answer, maybe? it may expose more devices to the internet. the more devices you have exposed, the more potential they can be hacked. they might not all be exposed to the internet though, and mesh networks are generally 'more professional' than some of these cheap routers with built in backdoors and default credentials

How have you dealt with ransomware payments that the US has embargo’s against? Do you work with 3rd party’s to facilitate an under the table agreement or do you have to tell the insured that they can’t get their information back?

How should a country handle some of these backdoors that appear to be state sponsored? If China is building in backdoors, the individual can't be expected to protect themselves. Who should be responsible for protecting against nation state exploits?

I've heard a term before but I can't recall it right now, where you build in a specific bug that you can later exploit - if you know about a potential buffer overflow in your own code and how to achieve RCE using it, you can hack the device at your leisure. Are there any ways to mitigate these issues, and how would you potentially prove/penalize this type of behavior?